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Abstract—The socially-distributed nature of cognitive pro-
cessing in military coalitions means that various features of
the coalition communication environment (e.g., communication
network topology) have the potential to inﬂuence collective
cognitive outcomes. At the present time, however, we have little
understanding of how the speciﬁc features of coalition communi-
cation environments inﬂuence the dynamics of collective cognitive
processing. In order to address this issue, a computational model
of one particular aspect of cognitive processing, namely collective
sensemaking, is proposed. The computational model provides
the basis for computer simulations that can be used to provide
some initial insight into how collective cognition is affected
by a variety of psychosocial and technological variables. In
addition to a description of the model, some speciﬁc proposals for
future simulation work are outlined. The results of experiments
using this model can be used to guide decisions about what
kind of real-world observational and experimental studies to
perform. In addition, when combined with empirical studies
that seek to validate model outputs in speciﬁc situations, the
model can be used to support the development of techniques and
technologies that maximize the collective cognitive potential of
military coalition organizations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Military coalitions are complex socio-technical organiza-
tions in which a variety of cognitive processes (e.g., those
associated with planning and decision-making) can be seen as
both socially- and technologically-distributed [1]. This view
has important implications for how we think about cognition in
military coalition contexts, and it also inﬂuences the approach
we adopt with respect to the analysis and engineering of
coalition communication environments. In particular, once we
see military coalitions as instances of distributed cognitive
systems (see [2]), it becomes clear that the effort to enhance
cognitive performance in such environments cannot concern
itself solely with forces and factors that reside inside the
heads of individual human agents; instead, the project needs to
broaden its scope to include those features of the coalition en-
vironment that inﬂuence cognitive processing at the collective
level.
One way in which we can develop a better understanding
of collective cognition in military coalition environments is by
undertaking empirical studies that systematically explore the
effect of various types of features (e.g., frequency of commu-
nication, communication network topology, information distri-
bution, and so on) on particular kinds of collective cognitive
outcome (e.g., the ability to make sense of uncertain, con-
ﬂicting or ambiguous information). Unfortunately, the nature
of the coalition environment means that studies with human
subjects are both difﬁcult to design and implement. As a result,
it may be important to consider the use of computer simulation
techniques (particularly those involving multi-agent systems)
in which some aspect of collective cognitive processing is
studied in silico. To this end, the current paper describes
a computational model that has been developed to support
empirical investigations into how collective cognition may be
affected by a variety of psychosocial and technological factors.
This model has been used to further our understanding of how
one particular kind of collective cognitive processing, namely
collective sensemaking (see Section II), might be inﬂuenced by
factors such as communication network structure [3] and the
frequency of inter-agent communication [4]. The current paper
provides an overview of the computational model and explains
how it can be adapted to explore speciﬁc research questions
concerning the relationship between coalition communication
environments and collective sensemaking abilities.
II. COLLECTIVE SENSEMAKING AND COALITION
OPERATIONS
As mentioned in Section I, the cognitive phenomenon
of interest in the current work is referred to as collective
sensemaking. As its name suggests, collective sensemaking is
regarded as the collective form of individual sensemaking in
which multiple individuals strive to make sense of particular
bodies of information, typically under situations of uncertaintyor ambiguity. At the individual level, sensemaking has been
deﬁned by Klein et al [5] as “a motivated, continuous effort to
understand connections (which can be among people, places,
and events) in order to anticipate their trajectories and act
effectively”. The notion of collective sensemaking is simply
the extension of this concept into the social domain. It refers
to the attempts of multiple individuals to coordinate their
individual processing activities in order to interpret some body
of conﬂicting, ambiguous or uncertain information.
Sensemaking is an important focus of research attention for
military coalitions because much of what military coalitions do
can be regarded as a form of sensemaking. Thus, the attempt
to make sense of information as a prelude to planning and
decision-making is a major preoccupation of coalition forces.
Sensemaking is also a concept that is central to the conceptual
framework for military network-centric operations (NCO) as
espoused by the U.S. Department of Defense [6]. In this case,
the advent of a more “robustly networked” ﬁghting force,
resulting from the introduction of more sophisticated commu-
nication and information networks, is supposed to facilitate
sensemaking at the collective level and thereby contribute to
better decision-making capabilities in a joint/coalition mili-
tary environment [6]. This hypothesized relationship between
communication networks, collective cognitive processing and
decision-making capability certainly has intuitive appeal; how-
ever, empirical studies are required in order to evaluate the
hypothesis and improve our understanding of how the speciﬁc
features of military coalition environments affect collective
sensemaking processes.
III. UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF COALITION
COMMUNICATION ENVIRONMENTS ON COLLECTIVE
SENSEMAKING: RESEARCH ISSUES
There are a variety of factors that may affect sensemaking
performance in a coalition setting. These include:
1) Network Structure: There is an increasing reliance
on mobile ad hoc networks (MANETS) within military
coalitions, and this may signiﬁcantly affect the dynamics
of inter-agent communication. We need to know what
effect different communication network structures have
on collective sensemaking. Do some types of network
structure yield better performance than others? What
about situations that feature time-variant changes in
communication network topology as might be encoun-
tered in MANET environments?
2) Communication Frequency: What is the effect of com-
munication frequency on collective sensemaking? Is it
better to enable continuous modes of inter-agent com-
munication, or is some more restrictive communication
policy to be preferred?
3) Trust: Different levels of trust between agents may lead
to inefﬁciencies in information processing. For example,
individuals from different groups may fail to adequately
integrate available information as a result of poor trust
relationships. We need to develop a better understanding
of how the dynamics of inter-agent trust affect collective
cognitive processing.
4) Cultural Differences: How should we represent cultural
differences in a computational model of collective sense-
making, and what effect do these cultural differences
have on collective sensemaking performance? Should
sensemaking teams consist of individuals from the same
cultural background, or should more culturally-diverse
groupings be countenanced?
5) Conﬁdence: Information transmission may be affected
by the conﬁdence individuals have in their judgements.
For example, an analyst may limit communication to
situations in which they have a certain level of con-
ﬁdence in their conclusions. How does conﬁdence-
based communication affect sensemaking performance?
Should information always be communicated irrespec-
tive of conﬁdence, or are more conservative schemes to
be preferred?
6) Information Sharing: The sharing of information
within a coalition organization may be limited for a
number of reasons. Security constraints may limit in-
formation access, communication networks may limit
information distribution, and differences in information
technology may make information difﬁcult to exploit
and integrate into ongoing cognitive processes. What
effect does partial information sharing have on sense-
making abilities?
7) Information Distribution: The information that is avail-
able to a coalition may be distributed across differ-
ent information sources. This means that some agents
(and groups of agents) may have access to bodies
of information that are not immediately accessible to
other agents. When agents collaborate in order to make
sense of some external state-of-affairs, we may expect
information sharing policies to interact with the distri-
bution of information and affect collective sensemaking
performance accordingly. It is important to understand
the nature of this effect.
8) Miscommunication: What happens to sensemaking per-
formance when miscommunication occurs during infor-
mation transmission? How detrimental is miscommuni-
cation to collective sensemaking?
9) Quality of Information: Military coalitions often have
to deal with information that is imperfect in a number
of ways. For example, information may be incomplete,
conﬂicting, ambiguous, and uncertain. How does collec-
tive sensemaking fare under these different informational
conditions?
10) Deception: Coalitions often operate in an environment
where hostile agencies attempt to undermine coalition
decision-making. This means that there is a high risk of
misinformation and deception. How vulnerable is group
performance to the effects of deception, and how is this
vulnerability affected by different aspects of the social,
informational and technological environment?
11) Expectations, Assumptions and Biases: How do initialexpectations and assumptions affect subsequent judge-
ments in collective sensemaking? Can we gain some
insight into the kind of cognitive biases that might
emerge in collective sensemaking scenarios by perform-
ing computer simulation studies?
As is clear from this list, there are a broad range of research
issues to consider in the context of sensemaking research.
These issues extends across the technical, social, cognitive,
cultural, and organizational dimensions of a coalition organi-
zation. In attempting to address these issues, we have adopted
an approach that is grounded in the use of a computational
model of sensemaking. Section IV provides details of this
computational model, and Section V shows how the model
can be adapted to address speciﬁc issues.
IV. A COMPUTATIONAL MODEL OF COLLECTIVE
SENSEMAKING
The computational model developed to explore the dynam-
ics of collective sensemaking is based on the consonance
model of Schultz and Lepper [7]. The consonance model was
originally developed to explore the psychological phenomenon
of cognitive dissonance; however, we suggest that the model
can also serve as the basis for computational analyses of
collective sensemaking. There are two reasons for this.
Firstly, the consonance model is based on the use of
constraint satisfaction networks (CSNs). CSNs are networks
of processing units that rely on patterns of spreading activation
in order to ﬁnd solutions to constraint satisfaction problems
(or problems in which solution outcomes need to be derived
against a backdrop of positive and negative constraints) [8].
Typically, CSNs are developed so that different solution out-
comes are represented by the activation levels of nodes in
the network, and constraints are represented by linking the
nodes together with positive or negatively weighted links. The
initial state of the problem is encoded as a pattern of activation
across the nodes of the network, and solutions that maximally
satisfy the constraints emerge across the course of successive
processing cycles. The solution to the problem is encoded
in the pattern of activity across the nodes at the end of the
simulation.
The use of CSNs to study constraint satisfaction problems
makes them of interest in the current context because we
suggest that sensemaking can be usefully viewed as a form
of constraint satisfaction problem. Sensemaking is a process
in which an agent attempts to form a consistent set of beliefs
subject to the constraints imposed by background knowledge,
initial expectations, available evidence and existing interpreta-
tions. In many ways, sensemaking bears much in common with
the psychological notion of coherence, which has also been
viewed as a constraint satisfaction problem (and researched
using CSNs) [9]. In their analysis of the concept of coherence,
Thagard and Verbeurgt [10] thus write:
“When we make sense of a text, a picture, a person,
or an event, we need to construct an interpretation
that ﬁts with the available information better than
alternative interpretations. The best interpretation is
has-fur 
meows 
cat 
has-feathers 
tweets 
bird 
Fig. 1. Example organization of cognitive units in a single agent. The circles
represent cognitive units, each of which consists of two processing nodes.
Solid lines represent excitatory connections between the units, while broken
lines represent inhibitory links.
one that provides the most coherent account of what
we want to understand, considering both pieces of
information that ﬁt with each other and pieces of
information that do not ﬁt with each other.” (pg. 2)
A second reason why the consonance model is attractive
as a sensemaking model is that dissonance reduction is seen
as the primary motivating mechanism for cognitive change
within the model. This aligns itself with work suggesting that
cognitive consistency may be useful in understanding the way
in which multiple forces (operating at the individual, social and
cultural levels) combine to inﬂuence the dynamics of collective
cognition [11].
The following subsections describe the various components
of the consonance-based computational model of collective
sensemaking.
A. Agent Cognitive Architecture
Each agent within the model is implemented as a separate
CSN, an example of which is illustrated in Figure 1. The nodes
in these networks are referred to as cognitive units because
each unit represents a particular cognition (e.g., belief) that an
agents can have1. The agent depicted in Figure 1 consists of
six cognitive units, and it is thus capable of entertaining six
beliefs.
Internally, each cognitive unit consists of two nodes which
are connected together in a mutual inhibitory fashion (see
Figure 2). One of these nodes is labeled as the ‘positive pole’
(P), and the other is labeled as the ‘negative pole’ (N). The
difference in activation between these two nodes determines
the net activation of the cognitive unit, which itself reﬂects
the strength and direction of the cognition represented by the
cognitive unit. In the case of beliefs, the polarity of cognitive
unit activation indicates whether an agent believes something
to be true or false, and the level of activation indicates the de-
gree of certainty or conﬁdence that the agent has with respect
to the belief. In the case of other cognitions (e.g., attitudes),
1The term ‘cognition’ can be used to refer to both the beliefs and attitudes
of an agent; however, in our work, we deal only with beliefs, and thus each
cognitive unit represents a distinct belief.P
N
Fig. 2. The anatomy of a cognitive unit. Each unit consists of two nodes,
one of which is the positive pole (P) and the other is the negative pole (N). P
and N are connected via mutual inhibitory links. In addition, each node has
an auto-regulatory connection that connects each node to itself. The function
of this auto-regulatory link is to dampen the node’s activity at each processing
cycle (see [7], for details). All links within the cognitive unit are inhibitory,
as is indicated by the broken lines in the ﬁgure.
the direction of activation may indicate whether something is
positively or negatively evaluated, and the activation level will
indicate the strength of the evaluation2.
The positive and negative poles of the cognitive unit are
connected via mutual inhibitory links, and this forms the
basis for competitive interactions between the nodes of the
cognitive unit3. The strength of cognitive unit activation (i.e.,
net activation) is thus a function of both the ‘P’ and ‘N’
nodes, and both of these nodes may be activated or inhibited
by nodes external to the cognitive unit. As noted by Schultz
and Lepper [7], this representational scheme allows for some
degree of ambivalence in agent cognitions. For example, there
might be some evidence supporting a particular belief and
other evidence that undermines the same belief. Similarly,
when it comes to evaluations and attitudes, something may
be both liked and disliked at the same time. Ambivalence will
tend to be reduced across successive processing cycles due
to the inhibitory connections between the ‘P’ and ‘N’ nodes;
however, ambivalence could persist if both the ‘P’ and ‘N’
nodes receive strong support from other cognitions.
Within an agent, cognitive units are connected to other
cognitive units via inhibitory or excitatory links (see Figure 1).
These links represent the relationship between two cognitions,
where the notion of a relationship subsumes things like logical
2The pattern of activity across the cognitive units at any point in time
corresponds to the cognitive state of the agent, and each of these states can
be seen as a particular point in the ‘cognitive landscape’ of the agent. In
essence, the cognitive units deﬁne the dimensions of a multi-dimensional state
space, and speciﬁc cognitive states correspond to points within this space. As
the pattern of activity in cognitive units changes across successive processing
cycles, the cognitive evolution of an agent can be tracked as a trajectory
through multi-dimensional space.
3The basis for this organizational scheme is tied to reviews of the neuro-
scientiﬁc literature (see [7]). In particular, Schultz and Lepper [7] argue that:
“neurons are sometimes organized into excitatory and inhibitory camps that
respond in opposite ways to input, one group being excited and the other
group being inhibited by the same input” (pg. 221).
implications, causal relationships, expectations and associa-
tions. The decision about whether to connect cognitive units
with a positive or negative link is based on the degree of com-
patibility or consistency between the cognitions represented by
the cognitive units. In dissonance theory, two cognitions can
be said to be dissonant when one follows from the obverse
of the other; consonant cognitions, in contrast, occur when
one cognition implies the other. In the consonance model,
this notion of dissonant and consonant cognitions is used to
conﬁgure the pattern of connections between cognitive units:
negative implications between cognitions are represented by
negatively-weighted (inhibitory) connections, and positive im-
plications are represented by positively-weighted (excitatory)
connections (unrelated cognitions are represented by zero-
weighted connections)4.
The role that inter-cognition linkages play in giving rise
to consistent or compatible belief states can be exempliﬁed
with respect to the CSN shown in Figure 1. Here we see
that the cognitive units are connected together in such a
way as to reﬂect the natural association of particular features
with particular objects. Thus, the ‘has-feathers’, ‘tweets’ and
‘bird’ units are all connected with excitatory connections.
This organization is intended to reﬂect an agent’s (admittedly
limited) knowledge about cat and bird objects. If one of
the units is artiﬁcially stimulated (a situation we consider as
analogous to the presentation of speciﬁc kinds of evidence),
then the activation of units that have positive connections
to that unit will be increased across successive processing
cycles. The end result is that agents will settle on belief states
that are most consistent with the evidence made available to
them, as well as their background knowledge of the domain
in question. If we artiﬁcially stimulate the ‘has-feathers’ unit,
for example, then the activity of the ‘bird’ and ‘tweets’ units
will increase, while that of the ‘cat’, ‘has-fur’ and ‘meows’
units will decrease. This reﬂects the agent’s belief that the
unidentiﬁed object is a bird, which seems a perfectly sensible
interpretation of the available evidence.
In addition to a sign, representing the nature of the re-
lationship between two cognitions, each connection between
cognitive units has a weighting that determines the amount of
inﬂuence one cognitive unit exerts over another. These weights
could assume a variety of values, and there is no reason why
the weights need to be uniform either within a single agent
or across multiple agents. The same two cognitions could
therefore be associated with the same or different weightings
in different agents. In general, we assume that the pattern
of connectivity between cognitions at the level of individual
agents reﬂects an agent’s background knowledge, training or
experience in some domain. This opens up the possibility
that agents could have different patterns of connectivity be-
tween cognitive units based on different prior experiences. In
4It is important to note that the nature of these connections is deemed
to reﬂect the psychological implication between two cognitions as perceived
by the agent. Thus, an agent might perceive there to be a logical or causal
relationship between two states of the environment, whereas in reality no such
relationship exists.previous simulation work, we assumed that all agents had
identical cognitive architectures, and all the inter-cognition
linkages were conﬁgured by hand [3], [4]. However, it is also
possible to imagine situations in which the kind of cognitions
agents have, and the manner in which they are connected, is
determined by some prior learning experience. In respect of
this possibility, previous work has shown how the connection
weights for CSNs might be learned through experience [12],
and this could constitute one means by which the current
model could be adapted for situations in which we want to
explore the effect of individual and group-level (e.g., cultural)
differences on sensemaking performance.
B. Agent Communication
Agents are organized into communication networks via
the inclusion of linkages between agents. These linkages
represent channels of communication and inﬂuence between
agents, and they enable us to explore the role of social
interaction in mediating cognitive change. Each inter-agent
connection is in fact a set of bidirectional linkages between
the corresponding cognitive units of communicating agents.
Thus, if agent A communicates with agent B, then connections
will exist between the respective ‘P’ and ‘N’ nodes of the
corresponding cognitive units in each agent. This pattern
of connectivity means that when agents communicate, they
exchange information about their beliefs along belief-speciﬁc
channels of communication.
As with the connections within an individual agent, the
connections between agents can have both a sign and a
weighting value. In previous work [3], [4], we used a single
weighting value of 0.5 for all inter-agent connections; however,
it is possible for more complex patterns of communication to
be envisaged. For example, particular communities of agents
may be endowed with strong intra-group and weak extra-
group channels of communication. Since the weighting of the
inter-agent connections determines the degree to which one
agent inﬂuences another, and agents inﬂuence one another to
different degrees based on a variety of factors (e.g., the level
of trust that exists between them), we can use the connectivity
patterns between agents to represent situations in which agents
exert variable inﬂuences over one another based on a variety
of criteria (e.g., cultural similarity). We can also allow the
weights to change dynamically throughout the course of a
simulation in order to model situations where communication
and inﬂuence grow progressively stronger (or weaker) over
time. Such situations are of particular interest in light of the
ﬁnding that dynamic communication networks may yield a
performance proﬁle that differs from that seen in the case of
more statically-conﬁgured networks [13].
The channels of communication between agents determines
the topological structure of the communication network. For
example, if all agents communicate with all other agents,
then the communication network structure will be fully-
connected. By varying the linkages between agents, therefore,
we can begin to examine how factors like the structure of
communication networks might affect collective sensemaking
performance (see [14]). In fact, the situation is somewhat
more complicated than this because there is no requirement
for agents to communicate all information about their cog-
nitive states to other agents; in some cases, agents may
limit communication to a particular subset of their cognitions.
This means that different cognitions within the same agent
may be differentially accessible to different communities of
agents. Some cognitions may be totally private (i.e., an agent
never establishes communication links with an agent about
these cognitions), while others may be publicly accessible to
different groups of agents (e.g., members of the same social
group). The fact that cognitions may be shared to a greater
or lesser extent means that we can study situations in which
information sharing is restricted to certain kinds of informa-
tion. This reﬂects the situation in military coalitions where
information sharing may be limited for technological, social,
or security-related reasons. It is even possible to imagine
situations in which some agents may deliberately try to subvert
the sensemaking abilities of other agents by broadcasting false
information about their cognitive states.
In most simulations, agents will be assumed to have the
same kind of cognitive units, and any actual or potential
communication will be assumed to occur through linkages
that connect cognitive units of the same type. By connecting
corresponding cognitive units together, we are effectively cre-
ating a situation where agents always understand the content
of messages transmitted by another agent. Even in situations
where the talking agent is deliberately misinforming the lis-
tening agent, we are still assuming that listening and talking
agents both understand what is being talked about. In real-
world situations, however, the content of speciﬁc messages
may be misunderstood as a result of linguistic or cultural
differences [15]. Such misunderstanding can be represented
in the current model by including linkages between different
cognitive units (i.e., cognitive units representing different kinds
of beliefs).
C. Computational Processing
At the beginning of a simulation, the activation levels of
certain nodes within each agent can be speciﬁed via an initial
activation vector. This initial activation is deemed to represent
an agent’s cognitive state at the outset of the simulation;
i.e., it establishes the pre-existing beliefs and attitudes held
by an agent. In most collective sensemaking scenarios, the
activation level of certain nodes may also be inﬂuenced by
‘environmental information’ that is external to the agent com-
munity. This information represents the information that agents
receive from a variety of information sources (e.g., sensor
systems). In previous work, such information has always been
supplied at the outset of a simulation (e.g., [4]); however,
information could also be supplied at certain points during the
course of a simulation, and, indeed, this may provide a better
approximation to the situation faced by military analysts in
real-world sensemaking scenarios.
Once the activation levels of nodes have been established,
computational processing occurs via the spreading of activa-tion between the cognitive units of the CSN following the
pattern of excitatory and inhibitory linkages between the units.
At each processing cycle in the simulation, the activation of
each node in the CSN is updated according to the following
rules:
ai(t + 1) = ai(t) + neti(ceiling   ai(t)) (1)
when neti > 0, and
ai(t + 1) = ai(t) + neti(ai(t)   floor) (2)
when neti < 0.
In these equations, ai(t + 1) is the activation of node i at
time t + 1, ai(t) is the activation of node i at time t, ceiling
is the maximal level of activation of the node (Schultz and
Lepper [7] use a value of 1.0 for ‘P’ nodes and a value of 0.5
for ‘N’ nodes), floor is the minimum activation of the node
(zero for all nodes), and neti is the net input to node i, which
is deﬁned as:
neti = resisti
X
j
wijaj (3)
where aj is the activation of node j that is connected to
node i, wij is the weighting associated with the connection
between i and j, and resisti is a measure of the resistance
of node i to having its activation changed. In general, the
smaller the value of this parameter, the greater the resistance
to activation change, and thus the greater the resistance to
cognitive change. One possible use of this parameter is to
make certain cognitions more or less resistant to change than
others.
At each point in the simulation, n nodes are randomly
selected and updated according to Equations 1 and 2, where
n corresponds to the number of nodes in the CSN. Agents are
then allowed to communicate information to their connected
peers (i.e., their immediate neighbors in the communication
network). Communication involves each agent contributing
activation to connected agents based on the activation levels
of their own constituent nodes. Each node is associated with
a parameter, comminputi, which is the weighted sum of
activation received from all talking agents. This parameter is
then updated according to the following equation:
comminputi =
X
j
WijAj (4)
where Aj represents the activation value of a node in the
talking agent and Wij represents the weight of the connection
from node j (in the talking agent) to node i (in the listening
agent).
At the next processing cycle, comminputi is incorporated
into the activation equations by extending Equation 3 as
follows:
neti = resisti(
X
j
wijaj + comminputi) (5)
A. Disconnected B. Random
C. Small-World D. Fully-Connected
Fig. 3. Examples of the network structures used in the experiments by Smart
[14]. Nodes represent agents and lines indicate channels of communication.
Once the communicated activation has been incorporated
into the node’s current activation level, comminputi is reset
to zero in order to avoid repetitive presentation of the same
communicated information across successive processing cy-
cles.
V. EXPLORING THE DYNAMICS OF COLLECTIVE
SENSEMAKING IN COALITION ENVIRONMENTS
Section III highlighted a number of issues that could be
the target of research into collective sensemaking. Table I
indicates how these research issues could be explored using
the computational model described in Section IV.
To date, the model described here has been used to examine
the effect of factors such as communication frequency and
communication network structure on collective sensemaking
[4], [3], [14]. In one study, for example, Smart and Shad-
bolt [4] examined the effect of a number of communication
variables on sensemaking performance. The results obtained
from this study suggested that precipitant forms of information
sharing may result in agents assigning undue signiﬁcance to
information that is largely consistent or compatible with pre-
existing or prevailing cognitions.
In another study, Smart [14] explored the effect of different
communication network structures on minority inﬂuence in
collective sensemaking situations. This study used four types
of communication network topology, examples of which are
illustrated in Figure 3. The results from this study suggested
that network topology can inﬂuence the extent to which
minority views are integrated into collective judgements. In
particular, fully-connected networks deliver a performance
proﬁle in which minority inﬂuence is minimized in situations
where both minority and majority groups are exposed to weak
evidence. However, the same networks serve to maximize mi-
nority inﬂuence when minority group members are selectivelyTABLE I
EXPLORING THE DYNAMICS OF COLLECTIVE SENSEMAKING IN COALITION ENVIRONMENTS.
Research Issue Experimental Approach
Network Structure Given that the connections between the cognitive units in different agents represent channels of commu-
nication, the pattern of connectivity between agents can be used to study the effect of communication
network structure on sensemaking abilities. We can thus examine sensemaking with different network
structures (e.g., small-world, random and fully-connected networks).
Communication
Frequency
Irrespective of the communication network structure that exists in any given simulation, communication
need not be enabled on every processing cycle. Instead, we can limit communication to particular cycles
or stages of a simulation. We can thus look at collective sensemaking performance under conditions of
both low and high frequency communication.
Trust Trust is represented by the weighting associated with speciﬁc inter-agent connections, and different values
can be speciﬁed for each channel of communication between two agents (i.e., agents may have different
levels of trust in respect of particular kinds of beliefs). This means that we can vary the weighting
between agents in order to examine the effect of trust on sensemaking processes.
Cultural Differences Cultural differences can be represented by creating groups of agents with different kinds of connectivity
between cognitive units. For example, a strong positive connection between two cognitive units in
agents of one cultural group may exist as a weak negative connection between agents in a different
cultural group. This will lead agents to process information in different ways and come to different
conclusions given the same body of external information. This may or may not be beneﬁcial to collective
sensemaking performance. Ideally, experimental simulations would use cultural groups in which the
weighting associated with cognitive unit connections had been acquired as a result of exposure to different
bodies of training data.
Conﬁdence Since the level of activation of a cognitive unit can be seen as providing a measure of conﬁdence, the
effect of communication under different levels of conﬁdence can be studied by introducing a threshold
for communication. For example, we may impose a constraint that conﬁdence (i.e., net activation) must
exceed a certain threshold before communication can take place.
Information Sharing The effect of information sharing can be studied by varying the connections that exist between particular
groups of agents. For example, we could have a situation where the connections between two agents are
limited to certain types of cognitive units. This corresponds to a situation where the agents communicate
freely about certain cognitions but not about others. We could also explore situations in which information
sharing is inﬂuenced by group membership. For example, communication between groups may be more
restrictive compared to that that exists within groups.
Information Distribution The effects of information distribution can be studied by presenting different agents with different kinds
of information (i.e., external activation) at the beginning and throughout a simulation. This distribution
could be organized with respect to group membership criteria such that agents in different groups are
selectively exposed to different bodies of information.
Miscommunication Miscommunication can be represented in the model by connecting different cognitive units in different
agents together either on a permanent or intermittent basis. Under normal circumstances, connections
should exist between cognitive units that represent the same kind of cognition. If a connection exists
between cognitive units that represent different kinds of cognition, then communication will cause the
listening agent to have a cognitive state that is different from that intended by the talking agent.
Quality of Information Quality of information is reﬂected in the kind of information agents receive from the environment. When
agents have access to perfect information about the environment, they will receive external activation that
coincides with reality (i.e., ground truth). More often than not, however, the information agents receive
will not be perfect; it will be distorted in various ways. Agents may thus be exposed to information on
some processing cycles that conﬂicts with that presented on earlier cycles, or they may be presented
with information that conﬂicts with that presented to other agents. Agents may also be presented
with ambiguous information that is consistent with two or more interpretations. In all these situations,
information quality is determined by the proﬁle of activation vectors that are supplied to agents at the
beginning and throughout the simulation.
Deception In some situations, agents may attempt to misinform other agents in order to subvert the sensemaking
process. This situation can be studied in the computational model by creating agents whose communicative
output is subject to distortion. For example, the polarity of the activation in some cognitive units might
be reversed whenever communication takes place with certain other agents.
Expectations,
Assumptions and Biases
Assumptions, expectations and biases can be represented by pre-activating certain cognitive units at the
beginning of a simulation. We might expect this to lead to particular biases in cases where ambiguous
information is subsequently presented (e.g., agents may converge on an interpretation that is consistent
with their initial expectations). The notion of cognitive resistance (as represented by the resistance
parameter - see Section IV-C) is likely to be important here. By varying the extent to which agents
are willing to change their beliefs in the face of conﬂicting evidence, we may be able to model the
discounting of contradictory information that takes place in at least some sensemaking scenarios.
exposed to strong evidence. These results suggest that fully-
connected networks differentially regulate minority inﬂuence
based on the kinds of evidence presented to both minority and
majority group members.
Obviously, the results that are obtained from these sorts of
simulation experiments should be treated with some caution.
In particular, we should avoid generalizing from the results
of computer simulation studies to the real-world without ﬁrst
validating model outputs using human-based experiments. The
main advantage of the computational model is that it enables
us to run a large number of experiments each exploring
different combinations of variables, and this is something thatis obviously difﬁcult or impossible to perform in real-world
coalition environments. The results from computer simulation
experiments can be useful in terms of guiding decisions about
the kind of real-world observational or experimental studies
to perform. In particular, they can be used to generate speciﬁc
hypotheses concerning collective cognitive performance, and
these hypotheses can subsequently be evaluated in the context
of real-world empirical analyses. By combining the results
from both real-world experiments and computer simulation
studies we can hope to derive some insight into how collective
cognition is affected by the features of coalition communica-
tion environments. This, in turn, will help to guide research
and development in other areas (e.g., the development of
physical communication networks, the development of sensor
information processing and delivery mechanisms, etc.) in
ways that enable military coalitions to optimally conﬁgure
their informational, technological and human resources from a
collective cognitive processing perspective. This is really the
sine qua non of military coalition research at the organizational
level: it is an attempt to understand how best to ‘wire up’ the
informational, technological and human elements of a military
coalition in order to maximize collective cognitive capabilities.
VI. CONCLUSION
Cognitive processing in military coalitions is often a collec-
tive endeavor. More often than not, activities such as planning
and decision-making require the coordinated effort of multiple
individuals working in conjunction with a variety of props,
aids and artefacts. The socially-distributed nature of cognitive
processing in military coalitions means that various features
of the coalition communication environment (e.g., communica-
tion network topology) have to potential to inﬂuence collective
cognitive outcomes. At the present time, however, we have
little understanding of how cognition may be inﬂuenced by
these social and technological factors. The current paper has
presented a computational model of one particular aspect
of cognitive processing, namely collective sensemaking. This
modeling effort provides the basis for computer simulations
that can be used to provide some initial insight into how
collective cognitive outcomes are inﬂuenced by features of the
coalition communication environment. When combined with
empirical studies that validate the results of speciﬁc simulation
efforts, the output from this work can be used to support
the effort to develop supportive techniques and technologies
that maximize the collective cognitive processing potential of
military coalition organizations.
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